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1. Introduction 
Recent years have seen a frequent use of random utility discrete choice models in demand and supply 
analysis for differentiated products under oligopolistic competition setting (e.g., Berry et al., 1995; 
Goldberg, 1995; Wojcik, 2000). Within this context, market demand is derived from discrete choice 
models of consumer behavior. The random utility of consumers depends on product attributes as well 
as individual characteristics; product market shares are then derived as the aggregate outcome of 
consumer decisions. On the supply side, firms are modeled as price-setting oligopolists, and 
endogenous market outcomes are derived from Nash equilibrium in prices.  
 For the sake of applying this framework for economic analysis, it is of interest to provide 
conditions for the existence and/or uniqueness of price equilibrium. Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) 
provide general conditions under which the proof of existence and uniqueness of pure strategy Nash 
price equilibrium can be established. Anderson et al. (1992) also prove that there exists a unique price 
equilibrium for a multinomial logit model. However, both results are for single product firms only.  
 In more realistic circumstances where multiproduct firms are involved, the existence and 
uniqueness of price equilibrium is usually assumed rather than proved a priori (e.g., Berry, 1994; 
Berry et al., 1995; Goldberg, 1995). Therefore, the purpose of this note is to make an extension of the 
results for single product firms to the case of multiproduct firms. Following the method of Anderson et 
al. (1992), we provide a proof on existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in prices in a nested 
multinomial logit model with multiproduct firm as nest. 
2. Model description 
Consider m  firms where firm j produces jK  variants of a differentiated product. Assume that firm j , 
1,2,...,j m= , has fixed cost jF  and produces at constant marginal cost 
k
jc  for its variants k , 
1,2,..., jk K= .   
 There are N  consumers in the economy and consumer i  has utility  
 
(1)   = k k k k k kij ij ij i j j ijU V y wε ε+ = + − +Z β  
 
for purchasing variant k  produced by firm j . 
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 Here iy  is consumer i ’s income; 
k
jZ
 is a vector with components being product 
attributes other than price; β  is a parameter vector and kjw  is the price of variant k  produced by 
firm j ; { }kijε are random error terms that are supposed to capture unobservable product attributes as 
well as unobservable individual-specific characteristics. The joint c.d.f. of the error terms is assumed 
to have the following multivariate extreme value distribution1   
 
(2)  ( ) ( )
2 1/
2
1,
Pr exp exp /
qK
k k r
ij j q
q rj k
x x
µ µ
ε µ
=
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟≤ = − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑I , 
 
where 1µ  and 2µ  are positive parameters, such that ( ]1 2/ 0,1µ µ ∈ , and have the interpretation that, 
( ) ( )22 1, 1 /k rij ijCorr ε ε µ µ= −  and ( ) ( )21 / 6kijVar ε µ π= . Moreover, (2) implies that ( ), 0k rij iqCorr ε ε =  
when q j≠ .  
 Thus, 1µ  and 2µ  indicates the inter- and intra-firm heterogeneity, respectively. If 
1 2µ µ> , the variants within a firm are closer substitutes than those produced by other firms (Ben-
Akiva and Lerman, 1985). If 1 2µ µ= , all variants no matter where they are produced are equally 
“distant” in terms of difference, then the nested multinomial logit model will boil down to a 
multinomial logit model, as we shall see below. 
 Given the above setting, the choice probability of consumer i  for choosing variant k  
produced by firm j , ( )kjP w , equals (we suppress subscript i  from now onwards for the sake of 
notational simplicity) 
 
(3)  ( ) ( )
( )
1
1
1 1
exp
exp /
= Pr max max
exp / exp
jq
k k
j j
jk k r
j j q m r rKq m r K
j j
q
q r
w
S
P U U
wS
µ µ
µ
µ
≤ ≤
=
=
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎝ ⎠
= = ⋅⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎛ ⎞⎝ ⎠ −⎝ ⎠ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑
Z
w
Z
2
2
β
β , 
 
where w  is a price vector for all products produced by all firms and  
 
                                                     
1 For this type of distribution and the derivation of the associated nested multinomial logit model, see Ben-Akiva and Lerman 
(1985, p. 304-310). 
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(4)  2
1
ln exp
j r rK
j j
j
r
w
S µ
µ
=
⎛ ⎞−
= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑
Z
2
β
. 
 
Here jS  can be interpreted as the expected utility that consumer i  receives from the choice among the 
products in firm (nest) j .  
 If we define ( )jQ w  as the marginal probability of choosing firm j  and ( )kjR w  as the 
conditional probability of choosing variant k  given that k  is produced by firm j , it follows from (2) 
that 
 
(5)  ( ) ( )
( )
1
1
1
exp /
exp /
j
j m
q
q
S
Q
S
µ
µ
=
=
∑
w , 
and 
(6)   ( )
1
exp
exp
j
k k
j j
k
j r rK
j j
r
w
R
w
µ
µ
=
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
= ⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑
Z
w
Z
2
2
β
β . 
 
Hence, we realize that ( )kjP w  can also be written as  
 
(7)  ( ) ( ) ( )k kj j jP Q R= ⋅w w w . 
3. Market Equilibrium 
Assume that firm j  takes the prices set by all other firms as given and it knows the mean demand 
( )kjNP w  for its variant k  as a function of price vector w . Consequently, firm j ’s decision problem 
is to choose the prices of all its variants, 1jw ,
2
jw … j
K
jw , in order to maximize its expected profit jπ  
conditional on all other firms’ prices, where profit is given as 
 
(8)  ( ) ( )
1
jK
k k k
j j j j j
k
w c NP Fπ
=
= − −∑ w . 
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Inserting ( )kjP w  from (3) into (8) and maximizing (8) with respect to 1jw , 2jw … jKjw with the prices of 
other firms as given yields 
 
 Proposition 1: 
 Assume that consumers i ’ utility function is given by (1) and (2). Under oligopolistic 
price competition, if market equilibrium exists, firm j ’s equilibrium prices must satisfy the following 
equations: 
 
(9)  
( ) ( )
1 1 2 2 1 1
1
...
1
1
j j
j
K K
j j j j j j K
k j
j
k
w c w c w c
Q
P
µ µ
=
− = − = = − = =
−
−∑ ww
, 1,2,...,j m= . 
 
 The proof of Proposition 1 is given in the Appendix. 
 
 Proposition 1 states that at market equilibrium firm j  will equalize the mark-up 
(difference between price and marginal cost) for each variant in order to maximize its total profit from 
all variants it produces. The fact that 2µ  does not appear in (9) indicates that at the equilibrium the 
intra-firm diversity doesn’t matter.   
4.  A proof on existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in 
prices 
As shown, (9) provides the necessary first order conditions for the market equilibrium prices 
1
jw ,
2
jw … j
K
jw  to maximize firm j ’s expected profit jπ , taking other firms’ prices as given. The 
sufficient conditions are guaranteed by the following proposition. 
 
 Proposition 2: 
 Taking other firms’ prices as given, the market equilibrium prices derived from the first 
order conditions as given by (9), 1jw ,
2
jw … j
K
jw , maximize firm j ’ s expected profit jπ  in (8).  
 
 The proof of Proposition 2 is given in the Appendix. 
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 Clearly, 1jw ,
2
jw … j
K
jw , as given by (9) are conditional on all other firms’ prices; they are 
de facto firm j ’s best response function to all other firms’ prices. The question of whether these ( m ) 
best response functions intersect at the same point in the price space, NEw , which gives the Nash price 
equilibrium, is answered by Proposition 3.  
 
 Proposition 3: 
 For the nested multinomial logit demand under oligopolistic price competition with each 
multiproduct firm as nest, there exists a unique Nash price equilibrium implicitly given by (9). 
 
 The proof of Proposition 3 is given in the Appendix. 
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
The first order condition 
 
 0js
jw
π∂
=
∂
  yields  
 ( ) ( ) ( )
1 11 2 2 1
1 1 1 11 0
j jK K
j s k k k s s k k k
j j j j j j j j js
k kj
NP w c P w c w c R
w
π
µ µ µ µ
= =
⎧ ⎫∂ ⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪
= + − − − + − − =⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟∂ ⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭∑ ∑ , 
 
for 1,2,..., js K= . Then (9) follows.  
  QED. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
The second order conditions for maximizing firm j ’s expected profit jπ  are given by 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2
1 11 2 2 1
1 11 2 2 1 2 1
2
2
1 1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1 1 1
/
1
j j
j j
s
j j k k k s s k k k
j j j j j j j js
k kj
k
js k k k s s k k
j j j j j j j j s
k k j
s
j
K K
s
j
K K
j
P
N c P c c
w
R
NP c P w c
w
NQ
w w w R
w
w R w
R
π
µ µ µ µ
µ µ µ µ µ µ
µ
= =
= =
∂ ∂
= + − − − + − −
∂∂
∂
+ ∂ − ∂ − + − + − −
∂
= −
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
2 1
1 1
0,sjRµ µ
+ − <
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭
 
 
and 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 2
1 11 2 2 1
1 11 2 1 2 1
1 1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1 1
/
j j
j j
s
j j j k k k s s k k k
j j j j j j j js t t s t
k kj j j j j
k
js k k k t t k k
j j j j j j j j t
k k j
K K
K K
P
N c P c c
w w w w w
R
NP c P w c
w
w w w R
w R w
π π
µ µ µ µ
µ µ µ µ µ
= =
= =
∂ ∂ ∂
= = + − − − + − −
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∂
+ ∂ − ∂ + − + − −
∂
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
2 1
1 1
0,s tj jjNQ R Rµ µ
= − >
⎪
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭
 
 
for { }, : 1, 2... js t k k K∈ =  and s t≠ , where the use is made of (9) and the fact that 
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1
1
jK
k
j
k
R
=
=∑   and  
1
0
j kK
j
s
k j
R
w
=
∂
=
∂∑ , 1,2,..., js K= . 
 
Consider the r th order ( )1, 2... jr K=  leading principal minors of the Hessian matrix, ( )rD w . 
 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
1 2
2 2 1 2 1 2 1
2 1
2 2 2
1 2 1
2 2 2
2 1 2
2 2 2
1 2
1
21
22
2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
...
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...
...
... ... ... ...
...
r
j j j
j j j
r
j j j j
j j j
r
j j j jr
j j j
r r
j j j j
rr s
j j
s
j
j
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R R R
NQ R
w
w
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µ µ µ µ µ µ µ
µ µ
π π π
π π π
π π π
=
− + − − −
−
∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂
∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= ∂
∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
= ∏
w
( )
1 2
2 2 1 2 1
1 2
2 1 2 1 2 2 1
1 2
2 2 1 2 1 2 1
2 2
1
1 1 1 1 1
...
... ... ... ...
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
...
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
...
1 1
... 0
...
r
j j j
r
j j j
r
j j j
rr s
j j
s
R R R
R R R
R R R
NQ R
µ µ µ µ µ
µ µ µ µ µ µ µ
µ µ µ µ µ µ µ
µ µ
=
− + − −
− − − + −
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−
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
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= ∏
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= ⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎩ ⎭
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where the third equality is obtained by adding (-1) × 1st row of the determinant to each of the rest (r-1) 
rows; the fourth equality is from adding successively the 2nd column, the 3rd column,…, the r th 
column to the 1st column; the last equality comes from the fact that the determinant now has the 
property that all its lower triangular elements are equal zero. Then it follows that  
 
  ( ) ( )1 0r rD− >w , 1, 2... jr K= . 
 
By Theorem 17.12 of Sydsæter and Hammond (1995, p. 639), Proposition 2 holds.  
  QED. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
Let 
 
(A.1)  1 1 2 2 ... j jK Kj j j j j j jw c w c w c ω− = − = = − = . 
 
Then (4) can be written as 
 
(A.2)  2 2
1 12 2
ln exp ln exp
j jr r r rK K
j j j j j
j j j j
r r
c c
S b
ω
µ µ ω ω
µ µ
= =
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− − −
= = − = −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∑ ∑
Z Zβ β
, 
 
where we have defined    
 
(A.3)  2
1 2
= ln exp
j r rK
j j
j
r
c
b µ
µ
=
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑
Z β
. 
 
Evidently, (5) can be rewritten as 
 
(A.4)  ( ) ( )( )
( )( )
( )
( )
1
1
1 1
exp / exp
exp / exp
j j j
j m m
q q q
q q
b x
Q
b x
ω µ
ω µ
= =
−
= =
−∑ ∑
w ,  
 
where   
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(A.5)  ( ) 1= /j j jx b ω µ− .  
 
Then (9) becomes 
 
(A.6)  11
1
exp
1
exp
j j
j
m
q
q
b x x
x
µµ
=
− =
−
∑
,   1,2,...,j m= . 
 
Anderson et al. (1992, p. 264-266) have demonstrated that there exists a unique solution jx , 
1,2,...,j m=  to (A.6).  Then from (A.1) and (A.5) the unique NEw consisting of m  price vectors 
( )1 2, ,..., , 1,2,...,jKj j jw w w j m= , can be found.  
  QED. 
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